Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.--U.S.--, 116 S.Ct. 1384 (1996) by Greene, Kegan Ellery
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology 
& Intellectual Property Law 
Volume 7 
Issue 2 Spring 1997 Article 8 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.--U.S.--, 116 S.Ct. 1384 
(1996) 
Kegan Ellery Greene 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip 
Recommended Citation 
Kegan E. Greene, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.--U.S.--, 116 S.Ct. 1384 (1996), 7 DePaul J. Art, 
Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 366 (1997) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss2/8 
This Case Summaries is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law by an authorized 
editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
CASE SUMMARIES
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.
---U.S. ---, 116 S.Ct. 1384 (1996)
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, Herbert Markman, brought a patent infringement claim
against defendant, Westview Instruments, for its use of Markman's
inventory control method for dry cleaning. The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania entered judgment for
Westview, despite the jury's finding of infringement.' The Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed, holding the interpretation
of a patent's claim terms to be the exclusive province of the court.
2
Certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court affirmed and concluded
that judges and not juries should decide the scope of a patent.3 As a
result, the construction of a patent, including any term of art within
its claim, is now reserved for a judge's determination. In its
unanimous decision, the Court cited judicial expertise and uniformity
as the basis for its decision.
4
FACTS
Markman owns United States Reissue Patent No. 33,054 for his
"Inventory Control and Reporting System for Drycleaning Stores."
5
The patent describes a system that can monitor and report the status,
1. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., -- U.S. -- , 116 S.Ct. 1384 (1996).
2. Id.
3. Id
4. Id
5. Id. at 1388.
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location and movement of clothing in a dry cleaning establishment.6
The Markman system consists of a keyboard and data processor
which generates written records for each transaction. These records
include a bar code that employees can use to log the progress of
clothing throughout the dry cleaning process.7 Westview's product
also includes a keyboard and processor. It also lists charges for the
dry cleaning services on bar-coded tickets that can be read by
portable optical detectors.
8
Markman brought an infingement suit against Westview and
Althon Enterprises, an operator of dry cleaning establishments using
Westview's products (collectively,"Westview"). Westview responded
that Markman's patent is not infringed by Westview' s system because
the latter functions merely to record an inventory of receivables by
tracking invoices and transaction totals, rather than recording and
tracking an inventory of articles- of clothing.9 Part of the dispute
hinged upon the meaning of the word "inventory," a term found in
Markman's claim, which states that Markman's product can "maintain
an inventory total" and "detect and localize spurious additions to
inventory." 10 The case was tried before ajury who listened to expert
witness testimony about the meaning of "inventory" and other claim
language.11
After the jury compared Markman's patented system to Westview's
device, it found an infingement of Markman's patent.12 The district
court nevertheless granted Westview's motion for judgment as a
matter of law. The court reasoned that the term "inventory" in
Markman's patent encompassed "both cash inventory and the actual
physical inventory of articles of clothing."' 3 Under the trial court's
construction of the patent, the production, sale or use of a tracking
system for dry cleaners would not infringe Markman's patent unless
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Markman, 116 S.Ct. at 1388 (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc., 772 F. Supp. 1535, 1537-1538 (E.D.Pa. 1991)).
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the product was capable of tracking articles of clothing throughout
the cleaning process and generating reports about their status and
location.14 Since Westview's system cannot perform these tasks, the
district court directed a verdict on the ground that Westview's device
does not have the "means to maintain an inventory total" and thus
cannot "detect and localize spurious additions to inventory as well as
spurious deletions therefrom," as required by Markman's claim.15
Markman appealed, arguing it was error for the district court to
substitute its construction of the disputed claim term "inventory" in
place of the jury's construction.16 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the interpretation of
claim terms are within the exclusive province of the court. Moreover,
the court found the purpose of the Seventh Amendment to be
consistent with its conclusion.' 7 Subsequently, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
The issue before the Court was whether the interpretation of a
patent claim is a matter of law reserved entirely for the court or
subject to the Seventh Amendment guarantee that a jury will
determine the meaning of any disputed term of art about which expert
testimony is offered. 18 A patent claim is the portion of a patent
document that defines the scope of the patentee's rights. The Court
held that the construction of a patent, including terms of art within its
claim, is exclusively within the province of the court.
19
The United States Supreme Court approached the issue in three
steps. First, the Court examined the history of patent infringement
claims and determined that the Seventh Amendment required a trial
by jury.2 0 Second, the Court looked to common law practice at the
14. Id.
15. Id (quoting Markman, 772 F. Supp. at 1537).
16. Markman, 116 S.Ct. at 1388.
17. Id (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (1995)).
18. Marlanan, 116 S.Ct. at 1384.
19. Id
20. Id
1997]
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time the Seventh Amendment was adopted and determined that
common law did not require that a jury, rather than a judge, interpret
all claims and terms of art.21 Third, the Court weighed case law
precedent, the relative interpretive skills of judges and juries and the
importance of uniformity in the treatment of patents to reach its
conclusion.2
2
I. THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT
The Court first examined the history of patent infringement cases.
The Court acknowledged that the Seventh Amendment right to a trial
by jury is a right which existed under the English common law when
the amendment was adopted.23 Thus, the first question for the Court
was whether infringement cases were analogous to a cause of action
that was tried at law.24 The Court noted that currently there is no
dispute that infringement cases must be tried before a jury, as
disputed by prior courts.25
This conclusion led the Court to address a second question:
whether a patent claim's construction was necessarily a jury issue.26
The Court reasoned that it must compare modem practice to historical
sources. The Court concluded that where there is no exact antecedent
in the common law, the modem practice should be compared to
earlier practices. The best analogy that can be drawn between the old
and the new must be sought.27 Accordingly, the Court shifted its
analysis to common law practice at the time the Seventh Amendment
was adopted.28
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1386. See, Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654,
657 (1935).
24. Markman, 116 S.Ct. at 1386.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id
28. Id,
369 [Vol. VII:366
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II. COMMON LAW PRACTICE
The Court found that there is no direct antecedent of modem claim
construction in historical sources.2 9  The closest 18th-century
analogue to modem claim construction is the construction of patent
specifications describing an invention. Early patent cases from
England and the United States courts show that judges, not juries,
construed specification terms.30  The Court concluded that no
authority from this period supported Markman's contention that the
task of defining terms of art in a specification fell within the jury's
province.
31
II. ALLOCATION
The Court found that common law practice at the time of the
framing of the Seventh Amendment did not entail application of the
Seventh Amendment's jury guarantee to the construction of the claim
document. Therefore, the Court looked elsewhere to determine how
to allocate the responsibility for the construction of a patent between
a court or jury. Accordingly, the Court consulted precedent and
considered both the relative interpretive skills of judges and juries
and the policies that ought to be furthered by the allocation.
A. Precedent
First, the Court looked to precedent. The Court explained that the
two elements to consider in a patent case are: (I) the construction the
patent and (2) a determination of infringement.32 The first element
is a question of law to be determined by a court by "construing the
letters-patent, and the description of the invention and specification
of claim annexed to them. 3 3 The second element is a question of
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id
32. Id at 1393.
33. Id (quoting Winans v. New York & Erie R. Co., 21 How. 88, 100, 16 L.Ed.
68 (1859)). See also Winans v. Denmead, 15 How. 330, 338, 14 L.Ed. 717 (1854);
1997]
5
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fact for the jury.14
In arguing for a different allocation of responsibility for the first
question, Markman relied on two cases: Bischoffv. Wethered35 and
Tucker v. Spalding.36 Markman asserted that these cases show that
evidence of the meaning of patent terms was offered to 19th-century
juries. Markman argued further that this conclusion implied that the
meaning of a documentary term was a jury issue whenever it was
subject to evidentiary proof.37
The Court rejected Markman's claim. The court reasoned that
Bischoffis a case in which a distinction was made between issues of
document interpretation and product identification and held that
expert testimony was properly presented to the jury on the ultimate
issue of that case, whether the physical objects produced by the patent
were identical. 38 The Court did not see the decision as bearing upon
the appropriate treatment of disputed terms.
Similarly, the Court dismissed Markman's reliance on Tucker. The
Court acknowledged that the reasoning in that case relied expressly
on Bischoff, and the case clearly noted that it was for the Court to "lay
down to the jury the law which should govern them. '" 39 In sum, the
Court reasoned that neither Bischoffnor Tucker indicated that juries
must resolve the meaning of terms of art in construing a patent, and
neither case undercut precedent.
40
B. Functional Considerations
Since precedent provided no clear answers, the Court next turned
to functional considerations to determine whether a judge or jury
should define terms of art.
The Court noted that "the construction of written instruments is one
Hoggv. Emerson, 6 How. 437, 484, 12 L.Ed 505 (1848); cf Parker v. Hulme, 18
F. Cas. 1138, 1140 (No. 10, 740) (CC E.D. Pa. 1849).
34. Id.
35. 76 U.S. 812 (1870).
36. 80 U.S. 453 (1872).
37. Markman, 116 S.Ct. at 1394.
38. Id.
39. Id. (quoting Tucker, 76 U.S. at 455).
40. Markman, 116 S.Ct at 1395.
[Vol. VII:366
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of those things that judges often do and are likely to do better than
jurors unburdened by training in exegesis." 41 In particular, patent
construction is a special occupation requiring, like all others, special
training and practice. A judge, with his training and discipline, is
more likely to give a proper interpretation to such instruments than a
jury would.42
Markman argued that a jury should decide a question of meaning
peculiar to a trade or profession because that issue involves testimony
requiring credibility determinations which are characteristically a jury
determination.43 The Court conceded that credibility judgments have
to be made about the experts who testify in patent cases. However,
the Court reasoned that such credibility determinations will be
subsumed within the sophisticated analysis of the whole document
required by the standard construction rule that a term can be defined
only in a way that comports with the instrument as a whole. 44 The
Court reasoned further that a jury's capabilities to evaluate demeanor,
to sense the "mainsprings of human conduct"45 or to reflect
community standards46 are much less significant than a judge's
trained ability to evaluate the testimony in relation to the overall
structure of the patent.47 In other words, the decision maker vested
with the task of construing the patent is in a better position to
ascertain whether an expert's proposed definition fully comports with
the specification and claims and consequently is better able to
preserve the patent's internal coherence. The Court concluded that
there is sufficient reason to treat the construction of terms of art like
many other responsibilities given to a judge in the normal course of
trial. 48
41. Id.
42. Id. (citing Parker v. Hulne, 18 F.Cas. at 1140).
43. Marlanan, 116 S.Ct. at 1395.
44. Id See also, Bates v. Coe, 98 U.S. 31, 38 (1878); cf US. Industrial
Chemicals, Inc. v. Carbide & Carbon Chemicals Corp., 315 U.S. 668, 678 (1942).
45. Markman, 116 S.Ct at 1395 (citing Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S.
278, 289 (1960)).
46. Markman, 116 S.Ct. at 1395 (citing United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d
1195, 1204 (C.A.9 1984) (en banc)).
47. Id
48. Markman, 116 S.Ct. at 1395.
3721997]
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C. Uniformity
Finally, the Court addressed the importance of uniformity in the
treatment of a given patent. The Court cited uniformity as an
independent reason to allocate all issues of construction to the court.
49
The Court noted that Congress created the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit as an exclusive appellate court for patent cases,
50
observing that increased uniformity would "strengthen the United
States patent system in such a way as to foster technological growth
and industrial innovation. ' 51
The Court reasoned that uniformity would be ill served by
submitting issues of document construction to juries.52 Allocating
questions of document construction to a jury would not necessarily
leave evidentiary questions of meaning wide open in every new court
in which a patent might be litigated, for principles of issue preclusion
would ordinarily foster uniformity.53 The Court reasoned further that
where issue preclusion cannot be asserted against new and
independent infringement defendants even within a given jurisdiction,
treating interpretive issues as purely legal will promote inter-
jurisdictional certainty through the application of stare decisis on
those questions not yet subject to inter-jurisdictional uniformity under
the authority of the Federal Circuit Court.5 4 The United States
Supreme Court concluded that uniformity would be encouraged by
allocating all issues of construction to the sole discretion of the
court.
55
CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court held that the construction of a
49. Id.
50. Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 97-312, pp. 20-23 (1981)).
51. Marlkman, 116 S.Ct. at 1395 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 97-312 at 20).
52. Markman, 116 S.Ct. at 1395.
53. Id (citing Cf. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill.
Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971)).
54. Markman, 116 S.Ct. at 1395.
55. Id
Vol. V1I:366373
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patent, including any term of art within its claim, is exclusively
within the province of the court.56 The Court looked to the history of
patent infringement actions, common-law practice at the time the
Seventh Amendment was adopted and precedent and policy
implications to reach its conclusion.
This decision is controversial in light of the inconclusive historical
precedent regarding the application of the Seventh Amendment right
to a jury trial. However, the advantages of the decision are clear.
The decision will grant judges, who are often more learned in the
interpretation of patent claims than juries, the power to give meaning
to terms of art in patent claims. In addition, the decision will promote
uniformity in the treatment of patents. Finally, the decision will
encourage patentees like Markman to specify the scope of invention
in a given patent, to secure to the patentee all rights to which the
patentee is entitled and to apprise the public of what subject matter is
not yet patented.
Kegan Ellery Greene
56. Id.
1997]
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